[langsec-discuss] Basic results?

Evan Sultanik evan.sultanik at digitaloperatives.com
Tue May 27 16:05:21 UTC 2014


On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 08:55:59PM -0700, Paul Burchard wrote:
> What are known results mitigating the basic computer science problem that
> it's normally expensive or impossible to answer the fundamental language
> security question: what might some code do with the powers it's given?

It depends on what question you're ultimately trying to answer.  While
answering the question,

   "What might this code do *under all possible inputs* with the
    powers it is given?"

is usually intractable, if not undecidable, it is important to
remember that solving the "dual" of the problem is often much easier:
"Does there exist an input that causes this code to [perform a
specific behavior]?"  In other words, it is often much easier to find
*at least one* certificate (i.e., input) that exercises a certain
desired behavior (e.g., halting).  If there are only a limited number
of behaviors about which one is concerned, this approach can often be
tractable, if not even efficient.

I may be side-stepping your actual question here, but my point is that
it can often be fruitful to constrain the set of inputs as opposed to
constraining the language.

There are already many program analysis techniques [1,2] like concolic
execution that provide an "oracle" for answering questions like, "Does
there exist a set of inputs that causes [a specific pointer] to be
used after it is freed?"  Constraint solvers [3,4] allow us to query
for inputs that exercise almost arbitrarily complex behaviors, many of
which are tractable to solve.  There has also been some recent success
at using machine learning to classify the behavioral characteristics
(as opposed to logical flow) of black-box binaries [5].  Liveness and
deadlock can also be relatively efficiently determined using solely
static analysis and model-checking [6,7].
<shameless-self-promotion>My employer, Digital Operatives [8], has
developed a static analysis tool for detecting liveness and performing
arbitrary constraint satisfaction and optimization on
LLVM/IR.</shameless-self-promotion>

Now, back to your actual question.  It's clear that
non-Turing-complete languages can be useful.  For example,
Hofstadter's old BlooP [9] language can do useful computations like
computing factorials, however, it explicitly disallows unbounded
(infinite) loops, so the halting problem is decidable for it.  A
somewhat more recent---but still old---example is the CHARITY
programming language [10], which uses category theory [11] to
guarantee termination.  Finally, you probably want to read the Hume
Report [12] which describes a hierarchical system architecture that
provides layers of non-Turing-completeness for security.

    - Evan

  [1] http://llvm.org/pubs/2008-12-OSDI-KLEE.html
  [2] http://s2e.epfl.ch/
  [3] http://chicory.stanford.edu/PAPERS/STP-ganesh-07.pdf
  [4] http://z3.codeplex.com/
  [5] http://www.blackhat.com/us-13/briefings.html#Saxe
  [6] http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_csf09.pdf
  [7] http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/lamport/tla/book-02-08-08.pdf
  [8] http://www.digitaloperatives.com/
  [9] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BlooP_and_FlooP
 [10] http://pll.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/charity1/www/home.html
 [11] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_theory
 [12] http://www-fp.cs.st-andrews.ac.uk/hume/report/hume-report.pdf

_______________________
Evan A. Sultanik, Ph.D.
Chief Scientist
Digital Operatives, LLC
Mobile: +1 215 919 7234
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 535 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <https://mail.langsec.org/pipermail/langsec-discuss/attachments/20140527/72b6256e/attachment.pgp>


More information about the langsec-discuss mailing list